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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

l

Plaintiff-Respondent, ji
V •

t

DAVID DAVIS,

)t

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890009-CA

Priority No. 2

i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of a third degree
felony in the Second District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann* S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.
1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Does the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violate

the privilege against self-incrimination?
2.

Is the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act void for

vagueness?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of all relevant statutes is contained in the
argument portion of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with distributing or possessing
cocaine without affixing the appropriate stamps, a third degree
felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-106 (Supp. 1989).
Defendant entered a conditional no contest plea# reserving the

right to appeal the trial court's ruling that the Utah Illegal
Drug Stamp Tax Act is constitutional.

Judge Hyde stayed

imposition of sentence (T. 7).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Drug Stamp Tax Act does not require an individual
to provide incriminating information.

In fact, the act

specifically provides that an individual need not provide such
information and, therefore, does not violate the Utah or United
States Constitutions.
The Act makes it unlawful for persons to possess or
distribute drugs without affixing the tax stamp to them.

The act

does not make it unlawful to misplace the tax stamp on the drugs
and, therefore, it is not vague for failing to provide guidance
as to where on the drugs to affix the stamp.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
Defendant alleges that the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax
Act (the Act) violates the Utah and United States Constitutions
by requiring him to provide information that will incriminate him
in order to comply with the Act.

Defendant's analysis of the Act

ignores provisions that distinguish it from others that have been
found to violate the Fifth Amendment.

A review of the Act

The District Court failed to transmit the information and the
judgment with the record on appeal. The State has filed a
request that these documents be transmitted by the district court
clerk. The State agrees that defendant entered a conditional
plea and, thereby, reserved his right to appeal the
constitutional issue.
_o_

reveals that it violates neither the United States nor the Utah
Constitutions.
In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968),
the United States Supreme Court held that the government may tax
illegal activities.

What the government may not do is establish

a method of taxation that violates the Fifth Amendment.

Id.

Thus, the issue in this case is not whether the State may impose
a tax on illegal drugs, but whether the method of collecting and
administering the taxes requires a person to provide information
that incriminates him.
The tax at issue in Marchetti was levied on persons
engaged in gambling.

The federal law required the IRS to provide

a list of taxpayers to prosecutors who requested it, required the
taxpayer to display a stamp indicating payment of the tax in
their business establishment or to provide it to treasury
officers upon demand, and allowed prosecutors to use evidence
that the accused possessed a stamp to prove guilt in a
prosecution for engaging in illegal gambling.

All of these

requirements violated the Fifth Amendment because they required
the accused to provide information that was incriminating in a
prosecution for engaging in the taxed activity.
Marchetti established three areas of inquiry for
determining whether a tax law violates the Fifth Amendment;

(1)

Is the tax in an area permeated with penal laws and, therefore,
directed towards a select group inherently suspected of criminal
activity?

(2)

In order to comply with the tax law, is one

compelled to provide information that he might reasonably suppose
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will be available to prosecutors?

(3) Does the compelled

information prove a significant link in the chain of evidence
tending to establish guilt?
The Utah Act does not satisfy the second and third
elements and is, therefore, constitutional.

Here, Utah Code Ann.

S 59-19-105(3) (Supp. 1989) states that illegal drug dealers are
not required to give any identifying information to the tax
commission.

Nothing in the Act requires the tax commission to

provide information to prosecutors.

Nothing in the Act or

anywhere in the criminal code affirmatively allows prosecutors to
use the fact that a person paid the tax as proof of any element
of a criminal offense.

Thus, information obtained as a

consequence of the Act is not readily available to assist
enforcement of laws prohibiting possession or distribution of
illegal drugs as was information obtained as a consequence of the
wagering tax laws in Marchetti.

Compare Marchetti, 390 U.S. at

47 with Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-105 (Supp. 1989).
Defendant complains that the Act's requirement that he
affix the stamps evidencing payment of the tax to the drugs
violates the Fifth Amendment because it would be an admission
that he knew that the drugs were illegal.

Defendant's assertion

would be true if the prosecutor were allowed to use the stamp for
proof of this fact in a criminal prosecution.

However, the Act

does not provide that a prosecutor may use the stamps in this way
and Marchetti precludes the prosecutor from doing so.
Defendant's argument, framed in the negative, that the act does
not make the evidence inadmissible does not serve to invalidate

the Act because this Court should, whenever possible, construe
statutes in a manner that renders them constitutional.

State v.

Packard, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1952).
Because the Utah Act is distinguishable from the
Marchetti laws, it satisfies the Fifth Amendment.

Nothing in the

Act requires an individual to provide incriminating information
to the State in order to comply with the act, and defendant's
contrary assertion is meritless.
Defendant also argues that the Act violates Utah Const,
art. I, S 12 by requiring him to give evidence against himself.
As defendant notes, art. I, S 12 is limited to testimonial
evidence; i.e. evidence that discloses to law enforcement a
defendant's own thoughts that might be incriminating.

American

Fork City v. Crosqrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1985), Stewart,
J. concurring.
The issue here is not whether the evidence, if provided
by the defendant, would have been testimonial in nature, but it
is whether the Act requires defendant to provide evidence against
himself at all.

The analysis provided above under the Fifth

Amendment is instructive here.

The Act does not require

individuals to provide evidence against themselves.

The Act

specifically states that an individual is not required to
identify themselves to the tax commission.

Moreover, the

prosecutor is not authorized to use the fact that an individual
paid the tax as evidence that he knew he possessed or distributed
illegal drugs.

The purchase of the stamps is an admission of

illegal activity only if it is actually used as such.

Where the

tax commission does not know the identity of the purchaser, it
cannot pass on that information to law enforcement.

Where the

State does not use the fact of purchase to prove any element of a
criminal offense, it has not used any information provided by an
individual to incriminate him.

Therefore, the Act does not

require an individual to provide anything either directly or
indirectly that would incriminate him.

It is, consequently,

viable under art. I, S 12 as well as the Fifth Amendment.
POINT II
THE UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
Defendant claims that the Act is unconstitutionally
vague under the Due Process clauses of the United States and Utah
Constitutions.

He complains that, although the Act requires him

to affix the stamp evidencing payment of the tax to the package
containing illegal drugs, it does not state where on the package
the stamp is to be affixed.

He asserts that he, therefore, is

unable to understand what conduct is prohibited and that law
enforcement may engage in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement of the statute.

This assertion lacks substance and

should be disregarded.
As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, due process
requires that "'[n]o one may be required at peril of life,
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statues.'"

State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1987),

quoting United States v. Batchelderf 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979).
Statutes must define a criminal offense "with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is

prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement."
357 (1983);

Kolender v. Lawson, 466 U.S. 352,

see also State v. Fontanaf 680 P.2d 1042# 1050 (Utah

1984); State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952).
Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-105(1) (Supp. 1989) states:
When a dealer purchases, acquires,
transports, or imports into this state
marihuana or controlled substances, he shall
permanently affix the official indicia on the
marihuana or controlled substances evidencing
the payment of the tax required under this
chapter. No stamp or other official indicia
may be used more than once.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1989) imposes criminal
sanctions for failing to affix the official indicia.

It

provides:
In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a
dealer distributing or possessing marihuana
or controlled substances without affixing the
appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia
is guilty of a felony of the third degree

Defendant complains that the tax commission has not adopted a
uniform system under Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-104(1) (Supp. 1989)
for affixing the stamps, labels or other indicia to the drugs and
that, therefore, he did not know where to place the stamps and
law enforcement did not know where to look for the stamps. This,
he urges, voids the statute and relieves him of criminal
responsibility for failing to obtain the stamps.
The criminal sanction is imposed not for misplacing the
stamps or labels or other indicia on the drugs but for failing to
affix them at all.

Defendant's argument might be well-taken if

the State was able to prosecute him for misplacing the official
indicia on the drugs.

Defendant does not claim that he purchased

the required indicia and then did not know what to do with it.
He failed completely to pay the drug tax.
defendant is charged is clear:

The offense with which

failure to affix the indicia to

the drugs is a third degree felony.

Law enforcement officers

look on the drugs to see if the official indicia is affixed to
them.

The law is sufficiently definite for defendant to know

what he did wrong; i.e. he failed to affix the official indicia
that he paid the drug tax to the drugs.

It is also sufficiently

definite for law enforcement officers to know where to look for
the official indicia; they look on the drugs.

The statute is not

void for vagueness simply because the tax commission has not
adopted a uniform system of affixing the official indicia to the
drugs.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to uphold the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act and to affirm
defendant's conviction.
DATED this /2> #j day of October, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

A L. $JpGR_.^
tant Attorney General
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